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Abstract
The severe economic crisis affecting Greece is widely expected to have a significant
social impact in terms of greater inequality and increased poverty. We provide an
early assessment of whether (and to what extent) this is the case. More specifically,
we distinguish  between two inter-related factors: on the one hand,  the austerity
measures taken to reduce fiscal deficits; on the other hand, the wider recession.
Using  the  European  tax-benefit  model  EUROMOD  we  attempt  to  quantify  the
distributional implications of both. With respect to the austerity measures, we focus
on  the  changes  introduced  in  spring  2010  in  income  tax,  public  sector  pay  and
pension benefits. With respect to the wider recession, we attempt to estimate the
distributional impact of the recent rise in unemployment by adjusting the model’s
input  dataset  in  the  light  of  recent  Labour  Force  Survey  data.  We  simulate  the
(ceteris paribus) impact of these changes on the distribution of incomes, while also
estimating how the total burden of the crisis is shared across income groups, taking
into account tax evasion and benefit non take up. We conclude by discussing the
methodological pitfalls and policy implications of our research.
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The distributional impact of the crisis in Greece
1. Introduction
From the beginning of 2010 Greece has been in the throes of a severe financial and
economic crisis – without doubt, the worst in living memory. After a decade of fast
growth, the underlying weakness of the Greek economy was made evident in October
2009, when the incoming government announced that earlier fiscal data had been
misreported.  The  fiscal  deficit  and  public  debt  estimates  for  2009 were  radically
revised
1. Financial  markets  reacted  by  increasing  spreads  on  Greek  bonds  and  by
lowering credit ratings (Meghir et al. 2010, Featherstone 2011).
In an effort to bring public finances back under control, the government announced a
first package of austerity measures in March 2010, followed by tax reform in April
2010.  When  these  failed  to  placate  the  markets, in  May  2010 the  government
negotiated an unprecedented €110 billion loan with the EU, the ECB and the IMF. In
return  for  the  loan,  the  government  signed  up  to  a  three-year  Memorandum  of
Economic and Financial Policies, which commits the Greek government to sweeping
spending cuts and revenue increases (IMF 2010). At the same time, a second austerity
package was also announced.
Under the terms of the austerity packages, public sector pay and pension benefits
were cut. Nominal reductions were compounded by rising inflation, caused by VAT
hikes  as  well  as  rising  oil  prices  internationally  and product  market  rigidities
domestically. In the context of tax reform, the government changed the schedule of
personal income tax, raised the top rate and announced a clampdown on tax evasion.
The measures took place when the Greek economy was already in recession, and
made it deeper still. After a negative growth (-2.0%) in 2009, GDP shrank by a further
4.5% in real terms in 2010. As a result, jobs and wages in the private sector suffered
considerably. The estimated reduction in employee compensation  in  private firms
outside  banking in  2010  was  7.3% on  average in  real  terms,  while  the  official
unemployment  rate was forecast  to  climb  to  14.6%  in  2011  (from 7.7%  in  2008).
Furthermore, self-employment earnings have also been affected.
The crisis (taken here to signify both austerity measures and the economic recession)
are widely expected to cause poverty and inequality to rise. However, predicting the
distributional effects of the crisis is not as straightforward as it may appear at first
sight. Its consequences on the most vulnerable individuals may vary substantially,
depending on the interaction between their labour market participation, the income
and employment status of other household members, and the capacity of the tax-
benefit system to absorb macroeconomic shocks (Atkinson 2009, Nolan 2009).
In this paper we provide an early assessment of whether (and to what extent) this is
the case. Specifically, we attempt to quantify the distributional implications of the
crisis using the European tax-benefit model EUROMOD. The paper’s structure is as
follows. Section 2 introduces the austerity measures and wider changes in incomes
and employment. Section 3 discusses the various methodological issues. Section 4
presents our tentative estimates of the distributional effects of the crisis. Section 5
reflects on the policy implications of our findings, on the limitations of our approach
and on issues for further research.
1 Deficit and debt projections have been revised from 3.7% to 15.4% of GDP and from 99.6%
and to 126.8% of GDP respectively (Bank of Greece 2011).2
2. The crisis
In the paper we distinguish between austerity measures and the wider recession. The
austerity measures concern policies introduced by the government in an attempt to
reduce fiscal deficits, either under the terms or in the context of the Memorandum
of Economic and Financial Policies agreed with the EU, the ECB and the IMF in May
2010. The wider recession indicates other changes in the economy, not directly under
the government’s control, though related to government policies (at least partly).
2.1. The austerity
Specifically, the austerity measures of spring 2010 were a combination of increases in
indirect taxes, introduction of new direct taxes, personal income tax reform, cuts in
public sector pay and in pensions. Later in the year, the fiscal squeeze affected other
social benefits and public services.
Public sector pay
Until recently, wages and salaries in Greece (in the public as well as in the private
sector) were paid in 14 monthly instalments. In 2010, the 13
th and 14
th salaries paid
to civil servants and public utilities employees were abolished. In their place, flat-
rate vacation allowances totalling €1,000 a year were introduced for public sector
workers earning less than €3,000 per month. Moreover, special allowances paid to
civil  servants
2  were  reduced  by  20%.  Public  utilities  employees,  whose  special
allowances other than family allowances are part of base pay, had the latter cut by
10%. Public sector salaries were frozen at their 2009 level and capped at €5,981 a
month. As  a result  of the above, average gross earnings in 2010 declined in real
terms relative to 2009 by an estimated 13.6% for civil servants and 9.7% for workers
in public enterprises (Bank of Greece 2011).
Indirect taxation
The standard rate of VAT was raised from 19% to 23% in two steps between March and
May 2010. Base and reduced rates were also increased from 4.5% to 5.5% and from 9%
to  11%  respectively. Other  indirect  taxes  also went  up: excise  duty  on  tobacco,
alcohol and fuel by 30%, taxes on luxury items by 20%.
Direct taxation
Personal income tax was restructured in April 2010. The new schedule is rather more
progressive (with 9 tax bands instead of 5), and provides for a personal tax allowance
of €12,000 per year and a higher top rate of 45% (for annual incomes over €100,000).
Moreover, the tax base was extended to include unemployment benefits, large family
benefits  and  non  contributory  disability  benefits, when taxable  income exceeds
€30,000 a year. Various tax allowances and credits were also revised. Also, personal
incomes over €100,000 in 2009 were made subject to a one-off extra tax at 1%, while
2 Family allowances, and extra allowances for seniority, post-graduate studies and in case of
hard and arduous occupation, were not affected by the cuts.3
a  similar  (and  much  resented)  tax  was  retrospectively  levied  on firms  who  had
registered large profits in 2009.
Pensioners’ solidarity contribution
A special levy on pension incomes (labelled “Pensioners’ solidarity contribution”) was
introduced in May 2010. Pensions under €1,400 per month were exempted. Above




Retirement pensions in Greece also used to be payable in 14 monthly instalments.
The 13
th and 14
th pensions have now been abolished
4, replaced by flat-rate vacation
allowances totalling €800 a year (payable only to pensioners aged over 60 receiving a
pension below €2,500 per month). Pensions were also frozen at their 2009 level.
Social benefits
Funding  cuts,  in  some  cases  aggravated  by a  significant  drop  in  social  insurance
organisations’ income from contributions, undermined the regular payment of social
benefits. In one instance (OEK rent benefit for private sector employees, the main
housing benefit in Greece), payment of benefit was entirely suspended for 2010. In
another instance (pensioners social solidarity supplement ΕΚΑΣ), the effort to weed
out  ineligible  claimants  intensified,  with  the  inevitable  result  that  some  eligible
recipients had their benefit suspended.
Public services
As a result of the fiscal squeeze, health and personal social services (such as child
care and  social  care  for  the  elderly),  as  well  as  education, have  also  suffered
funding  cuts,  which  to  some  extent  have  affected  the  quantity  and  quality  of
services provided.
Labour law
Finally, changes in labour law allowed collective agreements at industry- and firm-
level to set lower wages than those agreed under the National General Collective
Wage Agreement, while entry wages below the statutory minimum were introduced
for workers aged below 21.
3 The pension reform law, approved by Parliament in July 2010, is not discussed here, as its
effects on pension incomes will be felt in future years. For more information and an analysis,
see Matsaganis & Leventi (2011).
4 Invalidity pensions, social pensions and farmer basic pensions were exempted.4
2.2. The recession
Only partly in relation to austerity, the Greek economy plunged into a deep recession
in 2010 (GDP growth -4.5%, compared to -2.0% the year before). The most significant
developments were as follows:
Unemployment
The  overall unemployment rate has  risen sharply  from 7.7%  in  2008 (and 9.5%  in
2009), to 12.5% in 2010 (and a forecast 14.6% in 2011). Until very recently, labour
market  institutions  and  norms  in  Greece appeared  to  favour  primary  earners,
especially male breadwinners, at the expense of secondary earners. For instance,
unemployment among men aged 30-44 in 2008 was a mere 3.9%, while for women
aged 20-29 it was as high as 20.5%. One implication of the traditional pattern was
that  unemployment  and  poverty  rarely  overlapped,  affecting  different  population
groups.
As a result of the current crisis, unemployment has risen across the board: to 8.2%
for men aged 30-44, and to 29.0% for women aged 20-29 in 2010. The significant rise
in unemployment among primary earners introduces a new pattern, more reminiscent
of that in western and northern Europe. It also constitutes prima facie evidence that
the unemployed (especially households with unemployed head) account for a higher
share of the population in poverty. We will return to this point later on in the paper.
Private sector wages
In 2010 average gross earnings in private firms declined in real terms, relative to
2009, by an estimated 6.2%% in banking, and by 7.3% outside banking (Bank of Greece
2011).
Business closures
An unknown number of small businesses had to close as a result of the recession.
Also,  some  larger  employers,  mostly  in  light  manufacture  and  typically  in  North
Greece, relocated to other Balkan countries where labour costs and taxes are lower.
Self-employed earnings
Many more small businesses stayed afloat, muddling through even though trade was
less  than  brisk. As  a  result, earnings from  self  employment  (including  the  more
prestigious  “liberal  professions”  of  medical  doctors,  engineers  and  lawyers, were
lower than before the recession.
Inflation
In spite of the recession, VAT hikes plus rising oil prices abroad and product market
rigidities at home caused the harmonised Consumer Price Index to rise to 4.7% in
2010 (from 1.4% in 2009).5
3. Methodology
Our  analysis  makes  use  of  EUROMOD, a multi-country  tax-benefit  microsimulation
model that provides measures of direct taxes, social contributions, cash benefits and
market incomes in a comparable way across EU member states. EUROMOD simulates
non-contributory  cash  benefit  entitlements,  direct  tax  and  social  insurance
contribution liabilities on the basis of the tax-benefit rules in place and information
available in the underlying datasets. The components of the tax-benefit systems that
cannot be simulated (e.g. those depending on prior contributions) are taken from the
data along with information on original incomes
5. Baseline systems in EUROMOD have
been validated at micro level (i.e. case-by-case validation), as well as at macro level
(Figari, Iacovou, Skew & Sutherland 2010). Furthermore, the model has been tested
in numerous applications (e.g. Bargain 2006).
EUROMOD enables us to compute the disposable income of individuals under different
scenarios, taking account of the operation of tax-benefit systems and the way these
interact with market incomes and personal/household characteristics. In this paper,
the underlying micro data for Greece are provided by both the European (UDB) and
the national (PDB) version
6 of EU-SILC 2007. The use of the national version allows us
to exploit all information collected in the national questionnaires, which is closer to
the level of detail required for accurate tax and benefit simulations.
Estimating the effects of the crisis on the income distribution in 2010 using a dataset
(EU-SILC 2007) originally reporting incomes earned in 2006 is clearly unsatisfactory.
Due to the complexity of income surveys (including those - like EU-SILC - specifically
designed to provide prompt information), income data only become available after
considerable delay. For instance, the EU-SILC 2011 survey data (reporting incomes
earned in 2010) will not be released before March 2013 (cross-sectional component)
and August 2013 (longitudinal component).
A tax-benefit model like EUROMOD can fill the gap, providing timely estimates of the
effects of the crisis on the income distribution. To do so, it is necessary to update
the model to 2010. This involves three separate steps: (a) updating tax and benefit
policies, (b) uprating incomes, and (c) accounting for changes in the characteristics
of the population, namely the rise in unemployment.
Furthermore, EUROMOD, in common with most tax-benefit models, works under the
default  assumption  of  full  compliance  (i.e.  that  tax  and  benefit  rules  are fully
adhered to). This is an obvious oversimplification - most clearly so when tax evasion
and  non  take  up  of  benefits  are  present.  In  order  to  enhance  the  accuracy  and
credibility of our estimates, we have addressed tax evasion and benefit non take up.
Other issues we have also considered concern indirect taxation and benefits in kind.
A final issue concerns the choice of the poverty and inequality indicators we used to
assess distributional effects.
Below we explain how we dealt with the above issues in turn.
5 For further information see Sutherland (2007) and Lietz & Mantovani (2007). EUROMOD is
currently undergoing a major updating process. The aim is to have EUROMOD run on EU-SILC
in all EU-27 member states by 2012.
6 We are grateful to El.Stat., and especially to George Ntouros, for providing us with the data
of the national version of EU-SILC.6
Updating tax and benefit policies
We simulated the tax-benefit system of Greece for every single year from 2006 to
2010. In particular, we directly simulated as many of the policy changes described in
section 2 as was possible. These changes included cuts in public pensions via the
elimination of the 13
th and 14
th monthly payments, their replacement by pensioners’
vacation allowances, the introduction of pensioners’ solidarity contribution, the new
personal income tax schedule, the 1% lump-sum tax on high incomes, the extension
of the tax base, and most changes in tax credits and allowances (e.g. changes in tax
relief for dependent children, for installation of eco-friendly power systems, and for
private insurance contributions).
Furthermore, we took full account of the fact that provision of OEK rent subsidy, a
contributory income-tested housing benefit for dependent workers, was suspended in
2010.
Uprating incomes
We separately modelled the fall in earnings suffered by different groups of workers.
We accounted for the cuts in public sector pay by uprating civil servants’ and public
utility workers’  incomes from  dependent employment  on  the  basis  of  the latest
estimates of average rates of income growth provided by the Bank of Greece. With
respect to changes in private sector wages, we used the average rates of growth in
the relevant incomes over the relevant period (from 2006 to 2010), separately for
banking  and  non-banking  firms,  as  estimated  by  the  Bank  of  Greece  (2011). No
reliable information was available on recent changes in self-employment earnings. In
view of that, we applied the average rates of growth in  income from dependent
employment across the entire economy. Similarly, as we could find no information on
recent changes in farming incomes, we resorted to the expert guess
7 that incomes in
agriculture fell by 2.7% in 2009, and rose again by 2.8% in 2010. We uprated all other
market incomes (such as property incomes, investment incomes and the like) on the
basis of the most reliable information available. All uprating factors can be seen in
the Appendix (Table A.1)
8.
Accounting for the rise in unemployment
Standard practice in microsimulation is simply to ignore changes in the demographic
composition or in the labour market characteristics of the relevant population. This
is less unwise than it may seem, since such changes are likely to be negligible in the
short term over which policy changes are typically assessed. Nevertheless, given the
magnitude of the rise in unemployment in recent years in Greece, from 8.3% in the
data  year  (2007)  to  12.5%  in the  year  of  interest  (2010),  assuming  away such a
change would clearly have been inappropriate for this paper.
We accounted for the rise in unemployment by changing the employment status of
the required number of cases in the dataset. In other words, our approach draws on
7 We thank Stelios Katranides (University of Macedonia) for providing us with this informed
guess.
8 Note that the nominal rates of income growth shown in Table A.1 are exactly equivalent to
the real rates reported in section 2.7
Figari, Salvatori & Sutherland (2010)
9. Specifically, we split the relevant sub-sample
(workers in dependent employment other than tenured civil servants) into 56 groups
defined by gender, age and education. Within each group we moved a number of
cases from employment to unemployment in order to replicate as closely as possible
the pattern of unemployment shown in the 2010 Labour Force Survey
10. Those made
unemployed  in  the  dataset  were  assumed  to  have  zero  earnings  from  dependent
employment. By the same token, they were also assumed to claim unemployment
benefit (depending on their employment record). The resulting adjustment is shown
in Table A.2.
An alternative way to deal with changes in employment status might have been to re-
weight  the  EU-SILC sample  by  increasing  the  weights  of  households  containing
unemployed workers at the time of the survey, while at the same time reducing the
weights of other households so as to keep constant the composition of the dataset
(Immervoll et al. 2006). The drawback with that approach is that re-weighting would
amount to implicitly assuming that the characteristics of those losing their job at the
onset of the crisis are similar to those already unemployed at the time of the survey.
In the case of Greece this can be quite misleading, as all available evidence indicates
that the characteristics of those made unemployed in 2010 are quite different from
the characteristics of those made unemployed in earlier years.
Accounting for tax evasion
Under-reporting of personal incomes for the purposes of tax evasion is known to be
rife in Greece (OECD 2009). As a consequence, to ignore tax evasion when estimating
the distributional impact of the crisis would be seriously to undermine the validity of
our results. By assumption, and building on the findings of an earlier study of tax
evasion  in  2004 (Matsaganis &  Flevotomou 2010)
11, we introduce  rates  of  under-
reporting equal to 1% for salaries and wages, 0% for public pensions, 25% for self-
employment earnings and 55% for farming incomes (see Table A.3).
In accounting for tax evasion in EUROMOD we assume that individuals reveal their
real total net income (say N) to survey interviewers (in this case, EU-SILC). Let G
denote individuals’ real gross income (which includes the part of income which is not
reported to the tax authorities), and r the rate of income under-reporting. Further,
let T(G) denote the personal income tax function. In the presence of tax evasion, it
follows that:
G = N + T((1-r)* G))
By solving this recursive problem iteratively
12 and for each income source separately,
we obtain the values of real gross income, G. The rates of under-reporting are then
9 For a similar technique, see Baldini & Ciani (2010).
10 Unlike income surveys, labour force surveys usually release data within two or three months
from collection.
11  We  implicitly  assume  that  patterns  of  income  under-reporting  for  tax  evasion  did  not
change between 2004 and 2010. As a matter of fact, it is widely thought that tax evasion
intensified under conservative rule (2004-2009), and that was kept in check in 2010 as the
incoming  socialist government  made  threatening  noises  against  suspected  tax  evaders.
However, no hard evidence exists on the real extent of tax evasion in recent years. We are
currently involved in on-going research analyzing a large panel of income tax returns since
2005.
12 We thank Kostas Manios for providing us with the relevant code.8
used to separate the reported from the unreported part of gross income. EUROMOD
treats the former as subject to income tax and social insurance contributions (and as
used in resource assessment for means-tested benefits), while it adds the latter to
individuals’ disposable income.
Accounting for benefit non take up
EUROMOD by default assumes full benefit take up. However, not all social benefits
are claimed by those eligible. Recent evidence shows that the extent of non take up
in many countries (including Greece) is considerable
13.
In  this  paper,  correction  for  non  take up  was  carried  out  for  two income-tested
benefits: social  pension, aimed for non-recipients of  a contributory  pension aged
over 65; and unemployment assistance for older workers, targeted at the long-term
unemployed on low income.
In the former case, the social pension was only assigned to people  who declared
receipt in the original dataset (part simulation). Regarding unemployment assistance
for older workers, the benefit was randomly assigned to 5% of eligible recipients
14
(see Table A.4).
Accounting for indirect taxation
We could not directly account for VAT changes, as the underlying dataset does not
include information on consumption patterns (EU-SILC is not an expenditure survey).
To  provide  an  indirect  measure  of  the  incidence  of  VAT  hikes, we  applied  the
methodology established in earlier work (Decoster et al. 2010), using data from the
2004 Household Budget Survey
15. We were thus able to incorporate - albeit indirectly
- VAT increases in our analysis of the relative contribution of each austerity measure
to overall fiscal consolidation, and of their incidence by income quantile (Figure 3).
Nevertheless, we were unable to account for the distributional effects of changes in
VAT rates elsewhere in the paper.
(Not) accounting for benefits in kind
A significant aspect of the austerity is that the fiscal squeeze may affect the quality
and quantity of public services. Capturing the distributional impact of social benefits
in kind is  not  a  common  feature  of  most  tax-benefit  models.  In  spite  of  the
substantial progress made recently towards incorporating non-monetary components
into EUROMOD (see Paulus et al. 2010), the relevant module is not  yet generally
available. In view of the above, changes in the provision of social benefits in kind
(such as publicly-funded health care, education, care for the elderly, child care and
so on) are ignored in this paper.
13 For a recent analysis of non take up in Greece and in Spain, see Matsaganis et al. (2010).
For a review of non take up in several other EU countries, see Matsaganis et al. (2008).
14  In  the  original  EU-SILC  dataset,  eligibility  rules  for  unemployment  assistance  for  older
workers (under the assumption of full take  up) appeared to be met in 38 cases, whereas
receipt was reported by only 2. The latter, projected from the sample to the population, is
roughly equivalent to the known number of actual recipients from administrative data. The
implicit non take up rate (2/38) is approximately equal to 5%.
15 We thank Dirk Verwerft (University of Leuven ) for simulating VAT changes in Greece.9
Inequality indicators
To assess inequality effects we use three indicators. The first is the Gini coefficient,
probably the widest used inequality indicator, taking values ranging from 0 (total
equality) to 1 (max. inequality). The second inequality indicator is the coefficient of
variation, a measure of income dispersion (Duclos & Araar 2006). The third indicator
is the S80/S20 income quintile share ratio, measuring the (equivalised disposable)
income received by the richest 20% of the population divided by that received by the
poorest 20% of the population
16.
Poverty indicators
To assess poverty effects we use three so-called Laeken poverty indicators (Atkinson
et al. 2002). The first indicator is the standard poverty rate, measured in terms of
the proportion of the population with an equivalised income below 60% of the median
equivalised disposable income
17. The second indicator may be termed the extreme
poverty rate, measured  in  terms  of  the  proportion  of  the  population  with  an
equivalised income below 40% of the median equivalised disposable income.
Both of the above indicators measure poverty by reference to a poverty line that is a
function of median incomes. In other words, it goes up as median incomes improve,
and it goes down as median incomes fall. This is quite consistent with the concept of
“relative poverty”, and may not matter much when income growth is slow either
way.  Nevertheless,  at  times  of  rapid  change  in  living  standards,  individuals  may
compare their condition not so much with that of “the average person” in the society
in which they live, but with their own condition in a previous period.
In view of that, it may be more appropriate to use an indicator measuring poverty by
reference to a poverty threshold anchored at a fixed moment in time. Accordingly,
our third indicator reports the proportion of population with equivalised income in
2010 below 60% of the median of the 2009 distribution, adjusted for inflation
18. By
introducing  this indicator,  we  classify  as poor all those with  income above  the
standard poverty threshold in 2010, but with purchasing power below the standard
poverty threshold of 2009. In other words, we try to capture the experience of those
unable to purchase in 2010 the goods and services which were affordable to someone
with  income  exactly  equal  to  the  poverty  threshold  in  2009.  Arguably,  a  poverty
threshold anchored at a fixed moment in time is better suited to periods of rapid
change in living standards. In this sense, our third indicator may be thought better to
approximate the experience of impoverishment when nominal incomes fall and prices
rise.
16 In the terminology of the European Commission, the S80/S20 income quintile share ratio is
a structural indicator (key indicator 12), and an OMC indicator. The latter are “instruments
for monitoring the overarching objectives within the Open Method of Coordination on social
protection and social inclusion”. See EC (2010).
17 The  standard  poverty  rate  (At-risk-of-poverty  rate  after  social  transfers)  is  a  structural
indicator (key indicator 13b), and an OMC indicator).
18 The proportion of population with equivalised income in 2010 below 60% of the median of
the 2009 distribution, adjusted for inflation, is a specification of another OMC indicator (At-
risk-of-poverty rate anchored at a fixed moment in time).10
4. Results
What were the effects of the 2010 austerity measures and the wider recession on the
income distribution? Did they cause inequality and poverty to rise? How equitably was
the burden of the crisis shared between income groups? In this section we attempt to
provide some tentative answers to these questions.
Inequality effects
The estimated effect of austerity measures and the recession on inequality is shown
in Table 1. In terms of two indices (out of the three we selected), inequality actually
seems to decrease. In the case of the Gini index, the reduction is a mere 0.3%. In the
case of the coefficient of variation, the reduction (a more substantial 2.0%) implies
that the distribution of disposable income in 2010 became less dispersed relative to
2009 (i.e. pre-crisis). On the contrary, in terms of the S80/S20 index, the income
share of the richest 20% of the population relative to that of the poorest 20% appears
to have risen, from 6.11 in 2009 to 6.15 in 2010 (or by 0.6%).
Figure 1 offers a visual representation of changes in relative income share by decile.
It can be seen that the two poorest deciles actually lost ground in relative terms,
even though as a proportion of total disposable income their loss was tiny (less than
0.05%). The greatest loss was suffered by the richest decile (from 26.79% to 26.46%
of  total  income).  On  the  other  hand,  income  deciles  5-6  and  8-9  improved  their
position slightly. On the whole, changes in relative income share were rather small.
Poverty effects
Tables 2-4 show how our three poverty indicators were affected by the crisis. Results
are shown by age and by employment status of the household head
19.
Using the standard poverty line (at 60% of median), the overall poverty rate seems to
have risen a little: from 20.1% in 2009 to 20.9% in 2010. Looking at effects on specific
population  sub-groups,  poverty  rates  vary  widely;  from  nearly  0%  for  households
whose head worked in the public or banking sector, to over 40% for households whose
head was unemployed or a farmer. Households with an unemployed head appeared to
be worst hit by the crisis: their poverty rate went up by 9 percentage points (from
51.1% to 60.1%). With respect to age, the rise in poverty was more pronounced for
persons aged 30-44, the age group worst affected by the rise in unemployment (see
Table 2).
With reference to a lower poverty standard at 40% of median equivalised disposable
incomes, our results reveal a similar pattern: overall poverty increased from 7.3% in
2009 to 7.8% in 2010 (Table 3). In the case of households with an unemployed head,
the extreme poverty rate reached 38.5% (from 34.8% in 2009).
Using a poverty threshold anchored at a fixed moment in time (at 60% of the median
of the 2009 distribution, adjusted for inflation), alters results quite drastically (Table
4). Overall poverty rises by more than 5 percentage points to 25.2%. The increase is
19 Household head is defined as the person owning or renting the household’s dwelling. If two
or more persons share this responsibility, the head of household is the person with the highest
disposable income.11
pronounced for all age groups, and for most occupational categories. Once again,
households whose head was unemployed
20 fared worst, experiencing an increase in
their poverty risk from an already very high 51.1% in 2009 to 63.7% in 2010.
Income loss
Figure 2 presents our estimates of the effects of the crisis by income decile, both in
absolute terms (in equivalised euros per year, in 2009 prices) and in relative terms
(as a proportion of each decile’s disposable income in 2009, adjusted for inflation).
Note that our estimates focus on income alone, i.e. the effects of changes in indirect
taxation  are  ignored. Note also that  the  composition  of  income  deciles has  been
fixed in pre-crisis terms, i.e. individuals were ranked according to their equivalised
disposable income in 2009.
In absolute terms, a rather steep gradient can be observed. Households in the top
decile appear to have lost €4,324 per year per “equivalent adult” in 2009 prices (i.e.
as much as €9,081 per year for a couple with two children). By contrast, those in the
poorest decile were left €271 worse off (€568 per year for a family of four).
However, in relative terms the pattern of income loss looked a lot less progressive.
Households in the poorest decile lost an estimated 7.5% of their income; those in the
next poorest decile 8.0%. Around the middle of the distribution (deciles 3-7), relative
income loss fluctuated around 9%. Further up, income loss reached 9.9% (decile 8),
and peaked at 11.6% for households in the richest decile.
The burden of austerity
We now turn to a crucial (and politically contested) question: how was the burden of
austerity shared between income groups? Figure 3 shows the relative contribution of
the  main  austerity  measures  (including  increases  in  VAT  rates)  to  the  Greek
government’s overall fiscal consolidation effort, by income decile, as a proportion of
total savings.
An important finding, at first surprising, is that cuts in public sector pay and pension
benefits were almost exactly offset by increased spending on unemployment benefits
and lower income tax proceeds. The most effective (in terms of contribution to fiscal
consolidation) of all the austerity measures, and the one to have made a difference,
is the increase in VAT rates.
In distributional terms, a significant factor is the actual design of each measure. For
example, pensioners’  solidarity  contribution  was created  with  the  explicit  aim of
placing a much higher burden on high pension than on low ones
21. It can be clearly
seen that this was achieved, since this measure hardly affected anyone in the bottom
half of the income distribution. To a lesser extent, this is also the case with cuts in
pension benefits
22.
20 Note that following the adjustment to the dataset described in section 3, the population
share of households headed by unemployed rose from 2.0% in 2009 to 3.4% in 2010.
21 The estimated contribution of the top three deciles to total savings from the introduction
of pensioners’ solidarity contribution is estimated at 78%. The richest decile alone accounted
for 45% of total savings from this policy measure.
22 We estimated that 53% of the total savings from cuts in public pensions concerned the top
three deciles. In contrast, the bottom three deciles accounted for 7% of the relevant savings.12
Furthermore, much also depends on the income position of those affected by each
measure. For instance, most public sector workers tend to be located towards the
top of the income distribution. In fact, further analysis confirms that 74% of civil
servants and 65% of public utility workers were located in the top 30% of the income
distribution (Table A.5). As a result of that, even assuming a proportional reduction
in public sector pay (as we do here), the top 30% of the income distribution provided
an estimated 84% of the total fiscal savings from cuts in public sector pay
23.
Paradoxically, in spite of the changes in the structure of personal income tax, three
factors combined to make the changes less effective (in terms of tax proceeds) and
at the same time less progressive (in terms of distributional effects). The austerity
reduces the taxable incomes of public sector workers and pensioners. The recession
reduces other taxable incomes (i.e. wages and salaries of private sector employees,
and earnings of own account workers and the liberal professions). Tax evasion places
a significant share of real incomes from farming and self employment beyond the
control of the tax system, distorting the latter’s intended distributional effect.
Redistributive effects of each austerity measure can be more formally assessed by
calculating  the  values  of  index  of  residual  progression  proposed  by  Reynolds  and
Smolensky (1977). The index shows the difference between the actual value of the
Gini coefficient and its counterfactual value in the absence of changes in the policy
being assessed, keeping all other effects constant (see also Duclos and Araar 2006).
The results are shown in Table 5.
The values of the Reynolds-Smolensky index confirm that the redistributive effect of
cuts in public sector pay was considerably progressive. Moreover, changes in personal
income tax and the introduction of pensioners’ solidarity contribution also seem to
have been (mildly) progressive. On the other hand, the redistributive effect of cuts in
pension benefits was shown to be weakly regressive.
VAT changes (analysed separately) have been unambiguously regressive
24. In spite of
the fact that different rates may apply to different expenditure items (as is the case
with VAT in Greece), the structure of all indirect taxes remains largely proportional.
Moreover, as income falls the propensity to consume tends to rise, exceeding 1 at
low incomes (where families spend more than they earn, either by borrowing or by
drawing on past savings). As a result of both, poor households contribute a significant
proportion of the total tax take, which amounts to a very high proportion of their
own income.
On the whole, the rich appear to have shouldered most of the burden of the fiscal
consolidation effort: those in the top decile contributed 21.5% of total savings; those
in the next richest decile 14.3%. Nonetheless, the contribution of lower incomes was
far from negligible: those in the bottom decile accounted for 4.4% of total savings;
those in the next poorest decile for 6.1%. Since the relative income share of the two
lowest income deciles was respectively 2.5% and 4.3% (and leaving for a moment
aside the objection that our estimate of the impact of VAT changes is imperfect), we
23 Own calculations, available on request.
24 Specifically, the bottom three deciles contributed 18.5% of the total savings from VAT rate
increases. The poorest decile alone accounted for 5% of total savings. Further analysis, based
on data from the 2004 Household Budget Survey (results available on request), shows that the
increase in VAT corresponded to around 2.5% of each decile’s total consumption expenditure
across the distribution. On the contrary, as a proportion of each decile’s disposable income it
ranged from 2.5% for the richest decile to 6.5% for the poorest decile, rising monotonically as
income fell.13
can conclude that the poor contributed a clearly greater proportion of their income
than the rich to the government’s fiscal consolidation effort.
5. Concluding remarks
Our results can be summarized as follows. As a result of the austerity measures and
the  wider  recession in  Greece, relative poverty (as  measured  conventionally,  by
reference to a poverty threshold of 60% of median incomes) has increased from 20.1%
in 2009 to 20.9% to 2010. Extreme poverty (measured by reference to a threshold of
40% of median incomes) has followed a similar pattern, rising from 7.3% to 7.7%.
While these increases may appear unimpressive, poverty was shown to have risen to
25.1% if anchored in pre-crisis terms (measured by reference to a threshold of 60% of
median incomes in 2009, adjusted for inflation). We argue that the latter indicator is
better suited to periods of rapid change in living standards, better approximating the
experience of impoverishment when nominal incomes fall and prices rise (as was the
case in Greece in 2010 relative to 2009).
Looking at poverty by category, the situation of households headed by unemployed
workers emerges as clearly alarming. On the one hand, because of the sharp rise in
unemployment among primary earners, the relative weight of such households in the
population has increased considerably. On the other hand, the risk of poverty within
this group has risen further: of all individuals living in a household whose head was
unemployed, 38.5% had an income of less than 40% of median, while the proportion
of those with income below 60% of median was 60.1%!
Taking into account that the maximum duration of unemployment insurance benefit
is 12 months, that unemployment assistance benefit has narrow eligibility conditions
and suffers from massive non take up, while the rate of unemployment (and of long-
term unemployment) is expected to remain high in the immediate future, poverty
among the unemployed is certain to become the new social question par excellence.
Changes in inequality were less pronounced, while their general direction was rather
indeterminate: on the basis of available evidence, we cannot say with any degree of
safety whether the income distribution in Greece became more or less compressed as
a result of the crisis. In terms of relative income share, although the richest decile
appeared to have lost ground, so did the two poorest deciles.
Income losses were far greater for the rich than for the poor in absolute terms (i.e.
in euros). However, in relative terms (i.e. as a proportion of their income), lower
income groups suffered a significant loss of income. For instance, households in the
bottom quintile (i.e. the poorest 20% of the population) lost an estimated 8% of their
income, compared to an income loss of around 11% for households in the top quintile.
Some of the government’s austerity measures seem to have had a progressive effect:
either because special care was taken to make a particular policy “fair” by design
(e.g. changes in income tax, introduction of pensioners’ solidarity contribution), or
because those most affected were located towards the top of the income distribution
(e.g. public sector pay cuts). However, this was partly offset by the regressive effect
(albeit weak) of pension benefits cuts. Taking into account VAT rate increases would
tilt the balance decisively in the latter direction: as a proportion of their income, the
poor have contributed more than the rich to the government’s fiscal consolidation
effort.14
A certain amount of caution is called for when interpreting our results. The main
issues - to do either with the data we had to rely upon, or with our assumptions, or
with our approach - are briefly discussed below.
With respect to data, the original database offers an imperfect representation of
reality. The Greek dataset of EU-SILC 2007 over-samples some population sub-groups
(civil servants, public utility workers, banking  employees), while it under-samples
others (the self-employed, farmers, pensioners). If, as is often the case, the former
have higher income than the latter, a composition effect arises, with the implication
that poverty and inequality in the population could be higher than in the sample.
Moreover, uprating incomes from an earlier date to the present amounts to assuming
that everybody’s income from a given source has risen by the same rate over the
relevant period. This is clearly unrealistic, and could well understate distributional
changes. On the other hand, uprating some incomes (e.g. self-employed earnings,
incomes from farming etc.) is subject to an even greater degree of uncertainty.
On the other hand, the simulation of the tax-benefit system may be imperfect when
e.g. income tax rules are too complex to be accurately simulated, or when eligibility
for  means-tested  benefits  depends  on  income  in  previous  years. Furthermore,  as
discussed earlier, our approach to accounting for tax evasion, based on earlier work
(Matsaganis & Flevotomou 2010), even though a clear improvement over standard
practice, remains rather simplistic. Assuming that (a) rates of under-reporting have
not  changed  since  2004,  that (b) they only  vary  by  income  source,  and (c) that
everyone’s income from a given source is under-reported by same rate, leaves much
to be desired.
The same holds for the treatment of indirect taxation. In this paper, we have drawn
on findings from earlier research (Decoster at al. 2010) in order to account for the
likely impact of VAT changes, albeit in a rather crude manner. This was inevitable to
some extent, since EU-SILC is not an expenditure survey and contains no information
on consumption patterns. Nonetheless, given the salience of indirect taxes in the
Greek  tax  system, correctly estimating  their  distributional  impact  would  greatly
enhance the accuracy of our results.
On another register, the fiscal squeeze undermines the proper funding of the public
sector, adversely affecting essential public services and the “social wage”. However,
social  benefits  in-kind  (e.g.  publicly-funded  health  care,  child  care,  social  care,
education etc.) are ignored here. This issue has been addressed in recent work on
incorporating  non-monetary  components  into  EUROMOD  (Paulus  et  al.  2010).
However, we know too little about the actual effect of funding cuts on the quality
and quantity of social services. While collecting the relevant information and relating
inputs to outputs is impossible without a substantial amount of further research, the
gains could also be substantial.
Although we have made progress towards accounting for the rise in unemployment,
much remains to be done in order to capture the impact of the recession more fully.
In particular, we have implicitly assumed that the reduced demand for the goods and
services provided by the self-employed has resulted in loss of earnings but not in loss
of jobs. To some extent, this is a reasonable assumption: small businesses muddle
through even when trade is less than brisk, while some of those whose business does
fail are not classified as unemployed but either as involved in some other activity
(e.g. in farming) or as inactive (e.g. pensioners). Nevertheless, the assumption that
no self-employed worker was made unemployed as a result of the crisis seems rather
problematic.15
While we are fully aware that these weaknesses affect the accuracy of our results,
we are confident that our research offers a good approximation of the distributional
effects of austerity measures and the wider recession in Greece. Given the topicality
of the questions addressed, and the public interest in the answers, we believe that
work based on microsimulation is a good alternative to waiting until future waves of
EU-SILC are released. Furthermore, if the research question involves identifying the
effect of different factors, distinguishing between progressive and regressive items
within the same policy package (as is the case here), there really is no alternative to
microsimulation
25.
Our research is part of collaborative work, involving other European countries as well
(Leventi et al. 2010). In the immediate future we hope to improve our methods,
study more countries, and make use of better data as soon as they become available.
In the meantime, our findings show that, in order to share the burden of austerity
more equitably and to minimise losses for lower income groups, policies to reduce
Greece’s deficit need to be redesigned. In particular, the importance of fighting tax
evasion cannot be overstated: it is crucial from a fiscal point of view (improving tax
collection would help reduce budget deficits), as well as from a political point of
view (restoring distributional justice would go a long way towards making austerity
measures more acceptable).
Quite apart from the effects of the austerity, the wider recession (and, in particular,
the sharp rise in unemployment) has raised the demand for social benefits. So far,
the  Greek  government’s  response  has  been  inadequate  (Matsaganis  2011).  Even
though  the  number  of  unemployed  workers  rose  by 45.1% in December 2010
compared to the same month a year earlier, the number of unemployment benefit
recipients over the same period went up by only 9.6%. Rather perversely, housing
benefit was suspended in 2010, partly because the crisis slowed the flow of social
contributions into the relevant scheme. The frantic search for fiscal savings has not
spared social services, some of which (e.g. the successful Home Help programme)
suffered significantly. On the whole, the supply of social benefits seems to have been
reduced rather than increased. And yet, to prevent the economic crisis from turning
into a social catastrophe, a concerted effort is needed to tighten the social safety
net and to compensate the weakest groups from its adverse effects.
25 For a good example of a recent application of microsimulation to estimating the impact of
the austerity in the UK, see Browne & Levell (2010).16
References
Atkinson  A.B.  (2009) Stress-testing  the  welfare  state. In:  Rettferd  og  politikk:
festskrift til Hilde Bojer på 70-årsdagen (edited by B. Ofstad, O. Bjerkholt, K.
Skrede & A. Hylland). Emiliar Forlag: Oslo.
Atkinson A.B., Cantillon B., Marlier E. & Nolan B. (2002) Social indicators: the EU and
social inclusion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Baldini  M.  &  Ciani  E.  (2010)  Diseguaglianza  e  povertà  durante  la  recessione.
CAPPaper n. 75. Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia: Centro di Analisi delle
Politiche Pubbliche.
Bank of Greece (2011) Governor’s Report for the year 2010. Athens: Bank of Greece.
Bargain  O.  (2006)  Microsimulation  in action:  policy  analysis  in  Europe  using
EUROMOD. Research in Labor Economics 25. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Browne J. & Levell P. (2010) The distributional effect of tax and benefit reforms to
be introduced between June 2010 and April 2014: a revised assessment. IFS
Briefing Note BN108. London: The Institute for Fiscal Studies.
Decoster A., Loughrey J., O’Donoghue C. & Verwerft D. (2010) How regressive are
indirect taxes? A microsimulation analysis for five European countries. Journal
of Policy Analysis & Management 29 (2) 326-350.
Duclos  J.-Y. &  Araar  A.  (2006)  Poverty  and  equity:  measurement,  policy,  and
estimation with DAD. Boston/Dordrecht/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
EC (2010) The social situation in the European Union 2009. European Commission,
Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities.
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.
Featherstone K. (2011) The Greek sovereign debt crisis and EMU: a failing state in a
skewed regime. Journal of Common Market Studies 49 (2) 193–217.
Figari F., Iacovou M., Skew A. & Sutherland H. (2010) Approximations to the truth:
comparing survey and microsimulation approaches to measuring income for
social indicators. Working Paper No. 2010-13. University of Essex: Institute for
Social and Economic Research.
Figari F., Salvatori A. & Sutherland H. (2010) Economic downturn and stress testing
European welfare systems. Working Paper No. 2010-18. University of Essex:
Institute for Social and Economic Research.
IMF (2010) Greece: staff report on request for stand-by arrangement. Country Report
No. 10/110. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.
Immervoll H., Levy H., Lietz C., Mantovani D. & Sutherland H. (2006) The sensitivity
of poverty rates to macro-level changes in the European Union. Cambridge
Journal of Economics 30 181-199.
Leventi C., Levy H., Matsaganis M., Paulus A. & Sutherland H. (2010) Modelling the
distributional effects of austerity measures: the challenges of a comparative
perspective.  Research Note  8/2010.  Social  Situation  Observatory,  European
Commission.
Lietz  C. &  Mantovani  D.  (2007)  A  short  introduction  to  EUROMOD:  an  integrated
European tax-benefit model. In: Microsimulation in action: policy analysis in17
Europe using EUROMOD (edited by O. Bargain). Research in Labor Economics
25. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Matsaganis M. & Flevotomou M. (2010) Distributional implications of tax evasion in
Greece. GreeSE Paper 31. Hellenic Observatory, London School of Economics.
Matsaganis M. & Leventi C. (2011) Pathways to a universal basic pension in Greece.
Basic Income Studies (forthcoming).
Matsaganis M. (2011) The welfare state and the crisis: the case of Greece. Journal of
European Social Policy (forthcoming).
Matsaganis M., Levy H. & Flevotomou M. (2010) Non take up of social benefits in
Greece and Spain. Social Policy & Administration 44 (7) 827–844.
Matsaganis  M.,  Paulus  A. &  Sutherland  H.  (2008)  The  take  up  of  social  benefits.
Research Note 5/2008, Social Situation Observatory, European Commission.
Meghir C., Vayanos D. & Vettas N. (2010) The economic crisis in Greece: a time of
reform and opportunity (mimeo). Version published as “Greek reforms can yet
stave off default” Financial Times (23 August 2010).
Nolan B. (2009) Background note for roundtable discussion on monitoring the effects
of the financial crisis on vulnerable groups. Paris: Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development.
OECD  (2009)  Economic  Review -  Greece.  Paris:  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-
operation and Development.
Paulus A., Sutherland H. & Tsakloglou P. (2010) The distributional impact of in-kind
public  benefits  in  European  countries.  Journal  of  Policy  Analysis  &
Management 29 (2) 243–266.
Reynolds M. & Smolensky E. (1977) Public expenditure, taxes and the distribution of
income: the United States, 1950, 1961, 1970. New York: Academic Press.
Sutherland  H.  (2007)  EUROMOD:  the  tax-benefit  microsimulation  model  for  the
European Union. In: Modelling our future: population ageing, health and aged
care (edited by A. Gupta & A. Harding). International Symposia in Economic




2009 2010 difference (%)
Gini coefficient 0.349 0.348 -0.29
coefficient of variation 0.800 0.784 -2.00
S80/S20 income share ratio 6.109 6.147 +0.63
Source: EUROMOD version F4.0.19
TABLE 2
Poverty rates: poverty line at 60% of median incomes
2009 2010 difference
(p.p.)
all 20.06 20.92 +0.86
gender
men 19.04 20.07 +1.03
women 21.02 21.73 +0.71
age
0-15 21.41 22.23 +0.82
16-29 19.02 20.05 +1.03
30-44 16.44 17.82 +1.38
45-64 19.02 19.81 +0.79
65+ 24.61 24.97 +0.36
household head is:
unemployed 51.09 60.14 +9.05
employee (public sector or banking) 0.31 0.42 +0.11
employee (private sector excl. banking) 12.69 12.35 -0.34
liberal profession 3.79 3.72 -0.07
own account worker 16.63 17.49 +0.86
farmer 46.88 44.18 -2.70
pensioner 24.74 25.08 +0.34
other 20.65 21.47 +0.82
Note: The poverty threshold for a person living alone was €570 per month in 2009 vs.
€545 per month in 2010. In the case of a family of four (couple with two children)
the poverty threshold was €1198 per month in 2009 vs. €1144 per month in 2010.
Individuals are  ranked according  to  their  household  disposable  income,
equivalised  by  the  “modified  OECD”  equivalence  scale.  Household  disposable
income is defined as total income, from all sources, of all household members,
net of taxes and social insurance contributions.
Source: EUROMOD version F4.0.20
TABLE 3
Poverty rates: poverty line at 40% of median incomes
2009 2010 difference
(p.p.)
all 7.28 7.78 +0.50
gender
men 7.04 7.40 +0.36
women 7.50 8.13 +0.63
age
0-15 8.51 9.34 +0.83
16-29 8.30 8.79 +0.49
30-44 6.35 7.54 +1.19
45-64 8.27 8.40 +0.13
65+ 5.29 5.31 +0.02
household head is:
unemployed 34.77 38.53 +3.76
employee (public sector or banking) 0.00 0.00 +0.00
employee (private sector excl. banking) 3.32 2.91 -0.41
liberal profession 0.99 0.97 -0.02
own account worker 5.78 6.93 +1.15
farmer 24.26 19.95 -4.31
pensioner 5.56 5.66 +0.10
other 9.74 9.59 -0.15
Note: The poverty threshold for a person living alone was €380 per month in 2009 vs.
€363 per month in 2010. In the case of a family of four (couple with two children)
the poverty threshold was €799 per month in 2009 vs. €763 per month in 2010.
Individuals  are  ranked  according  to  their  household  disposable  income,
equivalised  by  the  “modified  OECD”  equivalence  scale.  Household  disposable
income is defined as total income, from all sources, of all household members,
net of taxes and social insurance contributions.
Source: EUROMOD version F4.0.21
TABLE 4
Poverty rates: poverty line at 60% of 2009 median incomes adjusted for inflation
2009 2010 difference
(p.p.)
all 20.06 25.20 +5.14
gender
men 19.04 24.26 +5.22
women 21.02 26.09 +5.07
age
0-15 21.41 27.48 +6.07
16-29 19.02 25.01 +5.99
30-44 16.44 21.84 +5.40
45-64 19.02 23.19 +4.17
65+ 24.61 29.30 +4.69
household head is:
unemployed 51.09 63.71 +12.62
employee (public sector or banking) 0.31 1.40 +1.09
employee (private sector excl. banking) 12.69 16.36 +3.67
liberal profession 3.79 3.72 -0.07
own account worker 16.63 21.00 +4.37
farmer 46.88 48.88 +2.00
pensioner 24.74 28.98 +4.24
other 20.65 28.57 +7.92
Note: The poverty threshold for a person living alone was €570 per month in 2009 vs.
€597 per month in 2010. In the case of a family of four (couple with two children)
the poverty threshold was €1198 per month in 2009 vs. €1254 per month in 2010.
Individuals  are  ranked  according  to  their  household  disposable  income,
equivalised  by  the  “modified  OECD”  equivalence  scale.  Household  disposable
income is defined as total income, from all sources, of all household members,
net of taxes and social insurance contributions.
Source: EUROMOD version F4.0.22
TABLE 5
Redistributive effect of austerity measures




income tax 0.34847 0.34891 +0.00044
pension benefits 0.34847 0.34843 -0.00004
public sector pay 0.34847 0.35115 +0.00268
pensioners’ solidarity contribution 0.34847 0.34906 +0.00059
Notes: The Reynolds-Smolensky index shows the difference between the actual value of
the Gini coefficient in 2010 and its counterfactual value in the absence of the
policy changes being assessed, keeping all other effects constant.
Source: EUROMOD version F4.0.23
FIGURE 1



























Note: Income deciles were constructed according to the “modified OECD” equivalence scale, based on equivalised disposable income in the
counterfactual scenario.
Source: EUROMOD version F4.0.24
FIGURE 2




























absolute loss in equivalised € per year (left axis) relative loss as % of 2009 income (right axis)
Note: Income loss is measured in real terms (i.e. adjusted for inflation), averaged for each decile. Income deciles were constructed according
to the “modified OECD” equivalence scale, based on equivalised disposable income in the counterfactual scenario.
Source: EUROMOD version F4.0.25
FIGURE 3


































VAT public sector pay pension benefits
pensioners' solidarity contribution unemployment benefit income tax
Note: Income deciles were constructed according to the “modified OECD” equivalence scale, based on equivalised disposable income in the
counterfactual scenario.




2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Income from dependent employment
civil service 1.000 1.038 1.112 1.170 1.058
public utilities 1.000 1.071 1.159 1.248 1.179
banking 1.000 1.089 1.089 1.129 1.109
non-banking private firms 1.000 1.061 1.130 1.162 1.128
Income from self employment
farming 1.000 1.008 0.946 0.920 0.946
own account workers 1.000 1.052 1.117 1.169 1.110
liberal professions 1.000 1.052 1.117 1.169 1.110
Investment / property income
Investment 1.000 1.031 1.119 1.089 1.164
property and rents 1.000 1.045 1.086 1.125 1.152
Other income
private transfers 1.000 1.052 1.117 1.169 1.110
non-cash income 1.000 1.052 1.117 1.169 1.110
income received by people aged under 16 1.000 1.052 1.117 1.169 1.110
Retirement pensions / benefits
main old age pension 1.000 1.040 1.071 1.071 1.071
supplementary old age pension 1.000 1.040 1.071 1.071 1.071
other minor pensions 1.000 1.040 1.071 1.071 1.071
survivors pension 1.000 1.040 1.071 1.071 1.071
orphans pension 1.000 1.040 1.071 1.071 1.071
pensioners’ social solidarity benefit 1.000 1.218 1.436 1.436 1.436
social pension 1.000 1.220 1.449 1.449 1.487
private pension 1.000 1.030 1.074 1.088 1.139
Unemployment benefits
unemployment insurance 1.000 1.181 1.299 1.459 1.459
unemployment assistance 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
minor unemployment benefits 1.000 1.181 1.299 1.459 1.459
Family benefits
3
rd child benefit 1.000 1.029 1.069 1.091 1.119
large family benefit 1.000 1.029 1.069 1.091 1.119
lifetime pension to many-children mothers 1.000 1.029 1.069 1.091 1.119
civil servants’ family benefit 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
support to families of children at school 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
minor family benefits 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Sickness / maternity benefits
contributory maternity benefits 1.000 1.052 1.117 1.169 1.110
health benefits 1.000 1.052 1.117 1.169 1.11027
TABLE A.1 (cont’d)
EUROMOD uprating factors
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Disability benefits
invalidity pensions 1.000 1.040 1.071 1.071 1.071
disability benefits 1.000 1.045 1.127 1.218 1.318
Other benefits
housing benefits 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
scholarships and grants 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
minor social assistance benefits 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
large property tax 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Tax relief
loan value 1.000 1.030 1.074 1.088 1.139
financial capital 1.000 1.030 1.074 1.088 1.139
rent paid 1.000 1.045 1.086 1.125 1.152
education expenses 1.000 1.030 1.074 1.088 1.140
housing cost 1.000 1.031 1.119 1.089 1.164
interest on mortgage payment 1.000 1.030 1.074 1.088 1.139
other housing costs 1.000 1.031 1.119 1.089 1.164
medical expenses 1.000 1.030 1.074 1.088 1.139
expenses for new heating systems 1.000 1.030 1.074 1.088 1.139
alimony expenditure 1.000 1.029 1.066 1.080 1.093
other maintenance payments 1.000 1.029 1.066 1.080 1.093
expenditure on private pensions 1.000 1.030 1.074 1.088 1.139
nominal GDP deflator 1.000 1.029 1.066 1.080 1.093
harmonised consumer price index 1.000 1.030 1.074 1.088 1.139
Source: El.Stat., Bank of Greece and various benefit-providing agencies.28
TABLE A.2
Unemployment rates: by age, gender and education attainment (%)
original
database LFS 2010 adjusted
database
men all (aged 20-64) 6.3 9.9 10.0
20-24 20.2 25.4 26.1
25-29 12.0 16.4 15.3
30-44 3.7 8.7 8.4
45-64 4.9 6.8 7.1
PhD or Master’s 4.2 6.7 7.1
university 4.7 6.1 6.1
technical and post secondary 8.0 10.3 10.3
upper secondary 6.7 10.2 10.2
lower secondary 6.4 12.2 12.2
primary (completed) 6.1 10.0 10.0
incomplete primary / no schooling 8.3 19.0 18.7
women all (aged 20-64) 13.0 15.6 15.7
20-24 38.1 39.7 40.6
25-29 18.6 23.0 24.3
30-44 11.7 15.0 13.8
45-64 6.0 9.1 8.3
PhD or Master’s 22.5 9.4 22.5
university 7.6 10.5 10.5
technical and post secondary 13.3 19.2 19.2
upper secondary 15.5 17.7 17.7
lower secondary 16.7 17.7 17.7
primary (completed) 11.4 13.4 13.4
incomplete primary / no schooling 6.4 18.3 14.2
Note: EUROMOD originally relied on data from EU-SILC 2007. To account for the rise in
unemployment, the underlying database was adjusted using data from LFS 2010.
Source: EUROMOD version F4.0.29
TABLE A.3
Correction for tax evasion
income source assumed rate of under-reporting (%)




Note: Stylised rates on the basis of the findings of Matsaganis & Flevotomou (2010).30
TABLE A.4
Correction for non take up
number of recipients
full take up admin data correction
social pension 102,842 63,806 71,694
unemployment assistance for older workers 33,523 1,089 784
Source: Various benefit-providing agencies; EUROMOD version F4.0.31
TABLE A.5
Income position of earners by occupational group (2009)
Position in the distribution
low income middle income high income
farmers 50 38 12
own account workers 20 37 43
private sector excl. banking 18 45 37
liberal professions 4 11 85
civil servants 2 24 74
public enterprises 1 34 65
banking employees 0 25 75
unemployed 47 40 13
pensioners 31 48 21
Note: “Low income” refers to the bottom 30% of the distribution (i.e. covers deciles 1-
3). “High income” refers to the top 30% of the distribution (i.e. covers deciles 8-
10). “Middle income” covers deciles 4-7 (inclusive).
Source: EUROMOD version F4.0.